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CASE COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY LAW: AN EXERCISE IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION-STAYING TRUE TO THE BROAD AIM OF
THE CODE OR IGNORING PLAIN MEANING AND PURPOSE?
HowardDelivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co.,
126 S. Ct. 2105 (2006)
DianaL. Hayes*

State law required Petitioner to maintain workers' compensation
coverage for his freight trucking business.1 Petitioner contracted with
Respondent to provide this insurance.2 After Petitioner canceled the policy
and filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy,3 Respondent, in an amended claim,
asserted that the unpaid premiums had priority status as contributions to
an employee benefit plan under § 507(a)(5)4 of the Bankruptcy Code.5 The
bankruptcy court held that the claim was not entitled to priority status
because, although the premiums were a benefit for employees, they were
statutorily required and not "tied to bargained-for, wage-substitution-type
benefits," and thus not intended by Congress to be included in the

* J.D. anticipated May 2008, University of Florida Levin College of Law. This Comment
is for my family, especially my mother, Judith Biniasz, for always being there with words of
encouragement when I need them.
1. Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (HowardlV), 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2109
(2006).
2. Id.
3. Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (In re Howard Delivery Serv., Inc.)
(Howardll),403 F.3d 228, 230 (4th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2105 (2006).
4. The statute states as a fifth priority:
[A]llowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan(A) arising from services rendered within 180 days before the date of the filing of
the petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor's business, whichever occurs
first; but only
(B) for each such plan, to the extent of(i) the number of employees covered by
each such plan multiplied by $10,000; less (ii) the aggregate amount paid to such
employees under paragraph (4) of this subsection, plus the aggregate amount paid
by the estate on behalf of such employees to any other employee benefit plan.
11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(5) (West 2007). This section was renumbered from 507(a)(4) to 507(a)(5)
by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 212, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). This change took effect 180 days after April 20, 2005. Cases before the
effective date will thus refer to what was then 507(a)(4).
5. Howard IV, 126 S. Ct. at 2109.
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priority.6 The district court affirmed, holding that workers' compensation
is not a wage substitute and that holding otherwise would excessively
broaden the scope of the Bankruptcy Code.7 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and held that claims for unpaid workers'
compensation insurance premiums are entitled to priority under
§ 507(a)(5).8 The judges, however, disagreed in their reasoning. Judge
King determined that the plain meaning of "contributions to an employee
benefit plan" included the claim. 9 Judge Shedd reasoned that although the
phrase was ambiguous, the legislative history allowed borrowing the
definition from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA),' 0 which includes workers' compensation as an employee benefit
plan." The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari12 and HELD that, due
6. In re Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. (Howardl), BK No. 02-30289, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS
2142, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. July 15,2003), af'd,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26464 (N.D. W. Va.
Dec. 22, 2003), rev'd, 403 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2105 (2006).
7. Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (In re Howard Delivery Serv., Inc.)
(Howardfl), No. 3:03CV61, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26464, at *12-14 (N.D. W. Va. Dec. 22,
2003), rev'd, 403 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2105 (2006).
8. HowardIII, 403 F.3d at 229.
9. Id. at 232 (King, J., concurring).
10. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (West 2007). ERISA provides:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan,
fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such
plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or
benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or
vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services ....
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms "employee pension
benefit plan" and "pension plan" mean any plan, fund, or program which was
heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an
employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a
result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program--(i) provided
retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by
employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or
beyond ....
(3) The term "employee benefit plan" or "plan" means an employee welfare
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an
employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.
Id.
11. See Howard II, 403 F.3d at 239 (Shedd, J., concurring).
12. Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (HowardIV), 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2110
(2006). The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuits. Id.
CompareTravelers Prop. Cas. Corp. v. Birmingham-Nashville Express, Inc. (In re Birmingham-
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to the equal distribution aim of the Bankruptcy Code and the doubt as to
whether workers' compensation claims clearly fit within the category of
"contributions to an employee benefit plan . . . arising from services
rendered," such claims are not entitled to priority status.' 3
Historically, in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the Court has
considered the equal distribution purpose of the statute to mandate strict
construction of the language to avoid preferring one claimant over
another. 4 In Nathanson v. NLRB, 5 the Board issued a complaint against
a company for unfair labor practices and ordered it to pay back wages to
employees who lost pay on account of the company's practices.' 6 The
company was then forced into involuntary bankruptcy, and the Board filed
a claim for the back wages.' 7 The issue before the Court was whether that
claim was entitled to priority status under § 64(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Act. 8
The Court first affirmed the lower court's ruling that the Board was a

Nashville Express, Inc.), 224 F.3d 511,512 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding workers' compensation claims
were not entitled to priority as contributions to an employee benefit plan), State Ins. Fund v. S. Star
Foods, Inc. (In re S. Star Foods, Inc.), 144 F.3d 712, 717 (10th Cir. 1998) (same), and Employers
Ins. of Wausau, Inc. v. Ramette (In re HLM Corp.), 62 F.3d 224,227 (8th Cir. 1995) (same), with
Howard I1, 403 F.3d at 229 (holding workers' compensation claims are entitled to priority as
contributions to an employee benefit plan), Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Plaid Pantries, Inc., 10
F.3d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1993) (same), andIn re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441,442 (1 st Cir.
1983) (same).
13. Howard IV, 126 S. Ct. at 2116. One of the reasons the Court held that workers'
compensation did not fit within the category is because it benefits employers. See id. at 2109. But,
pension plans also benefit employers, see Richard S. Soble et al., Pension-Related Claims in
Bankruptcy, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155, 156 (1982) (discussing tax advantages to pension plans that
make the plans attractive to employers), yet are explicitly within the priority. See H.R. REP. No.
95-595, at 187 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6148 (stating that the priority for
contributions to employee benefit plans "will include health insurance programs, life insurance
plans, pension funds, and all other forms of employee compensation that is not in the form of
wages").
14. See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25,28-29 (1952); Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color
Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941) (explaining that because of the equality-of-distribution theme of
the Bankruptcy Act, an unsecured creditor has the burden of showing clear and convincing
evidence that the creditor is entitled to a priority); see also John H. Rains IV, Note, Searchingfor
Fairnessin All the Wrong Places: Valuing the PensionBenefit GuarantyCorporation'sUnsecured
Claim in Bankruptcy, 58 FLA. L. REv. 1107, 1117 (2006) (describing the payment of creditors in
accordance with equal treatment within classes of claims).
15. 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
16. Id. at26.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 27. Section 64(a)(5) provides: "The debts to have priority... shall be... (5) debts
owing to any person, including the United States, who by the laws of the United States in [sic]
entitled to priority ... " Bankruptcy Act, Amendments of 1898, ch. 575, § 64, 52 Stat. 840, 874,
repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
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creditor of the company.9 However, the Court determined that although
the Board was an agency of the United States, it did not follow that any
debt owed to the Board was a debt owed to the United States.2" Looking
beyond the language to the purpose of the priority, the Court found that the
purpose of assuring public revenue was not met since the back pay would
go to private individuals. 2 Thus, the Court held that the equality-ofdistribution theme of the Bankruptcy Code controlled,22 and absent a clear
purpose to the contrary, the back pay awards should not be treated any
differently from other wage claims.23
This narrow reading of priorities continued in UnitedStates v. Embassy
Restaurant, Inc.,24 where the Court held that contributions to a union
welfare fund, required by a collective bargaining agreement, were not
entitled to priority status as "'wages ... due to workmen.' under the
Bankruptcy Act.25 At the time of this case, there was no priority for benefit
plans.2 6 The defendant, a restaurant with union employees, entered into a
collective bargaining agreement that set hours, wages, and conditions of
employment.27 The agreement also required that the employer contribute
a set amount to the trustees of the welfare fund.28 When the employer filed
for bankruptcy, the trustee filed a claim for unpaid contributions and
asserted priority status.2 9
To determine if the claim qualified as priority, the Court first noted the
equal distribution policy of the Bankruptcy Act.3" Since the contributions
19. Nathanson, 344 U.S. at 27.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 27-28.
22. As the dissent pointed out, however, an equality-of-distribution theme loses meaning
when considering sections of the statute "designed to establish inequality by a series of priorities."
Id. at 32 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 186 (1977), as reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6147 (recognizing the existence of special circumstances or special needs
calling for exceptions to the general policy of pro-rata distribution).
23. See Nathanson, 344 U.S. at 29.
24. 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
25. Id. at 29, 35 (quoting § 64(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act); see also Joint Indus. Bd. of the
Elec. Indus. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1968) (holding that claims for unpaid
contributions to provide deferred benefits to employees were not entitled to the priority of wages).
26. See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (HowardIV), 126 S. Ct. 2105,
2110-11 (2006) (noting that § 507(a)(5) was enacted in response to Embassy and Joint Industry
Board in order to provide a priority for benefits, which were denied in those cases).
27. Embassy, 359 U.S. at 30.
28. Id. The welfare fund would provide life insurance, sick benefits, and hospital and surgical
benefits. Id.
29. Id. at 30-31.
30. Id. at 31 (recognizing at the outset that "'[t]he broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is
to bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate...' and that 'if one claimant is to
be preferred over others, the purpose should be clear from the statute"' (omission in original)
(quoting Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224,227 (1930) and Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S.
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did not clearly fit within the language of the provision," they could not be
entitled to priority unless they satisfied the specific purpose of the
provision." The Court found that the purpose of providing employees
displaced by bankruptcy prompt access to back wages did not extend to
fringe benefits.3 Thus, the Court read the priority narrowly, and
determined that if the wages priority was to include claims for fringe
benefits, it would have to be expanded by Congress.34
In response to Embassy, Congress in 1978 amended the Bankruptcy
Code to add a new priority for contributions to employee benefit plans.35
This priority was intended to encompass those fringe benefits received by
employees as substitutes for wages, such as pension plans and health or
life insurance plans.3 6 The purpose of the priority, like the purpose of the
wage priority it is connected with, is in part to ensure that employees will
not leave a failing business out of fear of losing compensation.3 7 Thus, the
new priority was to provide more protection to employees.38
Although the Embassy Court began its analysis with the equal
distribution purpose of the Bankruptcy Act,39 where the statutory language
is clear, principles of statutory construction require the Court to look at the
plain meaning of the statute,4" even if it conflicts with the equal

25, 29 (1952))).
31. The Court refused to expand the definition of wages to encompass the contributions by
reference to other statutes, such as the National Labor Relations Act or the Social Security Act,
which had been determined by courts to define various fringe benefits as wages. See id at 33.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 32-33. Notably, the Court also discussed the separate priority which used to be
afforded workers' compensation claims as evidence that Congress did not intend all types of
obligations due employees to be included in the wages priority. See id. at 32. The Court thus
appeared to associate workers' compensation with other forms of fringe benefits. See id.
34. See id. at 35.
35. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 69 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5855; 4
COLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 507.06 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2006).
36. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 69 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5855.
37. SeeH.R. REP.NO. 95-595, at 187 (1977), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,614748; In re Aer-Aerotron, Inc., 182 B.R. 725, 727 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995) (reasoning that because
Congress intended the priority to protect employees, it could not extend to a third party insurer).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 188 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6148.
39. Embassy, 359 U.S. at 31.
40. See Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354,
359-60 (1982) (."[I]f [the language of a statute] is plain ... the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms."' (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917)));
Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485-86 (explaining that if the meaning of the statute is clear from the
language, construed in its ordinary and usual sense, then the court's sole function is to enforce it
according to its terms). But see United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940) (allowing the court to look beyond the words of statutes to the purpose of the act when the
plain meaning leads to a result at odds with the policy of the legislation).
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distribution purpose.41 In United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,Inc.,42
after respondent filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the government obtained
a nonconsensual security interest in his property through a tax lien.43 The
44
government then sought recovery of postpetition interest under § 506(b)
because the claim was oversecured. 45 The Court looked solely to the
statutory language in holding that postpetition interest was plainly
available to holders of secured interests, regardless of whether they are
consensual or nonconsensual.46 Even though this holding was "somewhat
in tension with the desirability of paying all creditors as uniformly as
practicable," the Court
determined that the plain language of the statute
47
result.
this
required
The instant Court's interpretation of § 506(a)(5) priority followed the
narrow construction of the Code in order to secure equal distribution
among creditors. 48 Although the instant Court did not explicitly look to the
language of the priority provision in its opinion, it did conclude that it was
far from clear that workers' compensation could be considered
"contributions to an employee benefit plan ...arising from services

41. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 245-46 (1989); Small Bus.
Admin. v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446,452-53 (1960) (allowing the priority for debts due the United
States to attach to a debt owed jointly to the Small Business Administration and a private bank,
even though it placed the bank in a better position than other private unsecured creditors).
42. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
43. Id.at 237. Obtaining a valid security interest in property gives a creditor heightened
protection in bankruptcy. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Crazy After All These Years: The
Absolute Assignment of Rents in MortgageLoan Transactions,59 FLA. L. REV. 487, 520 (2007).
44. Section 506(b) provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of
which, after any recovery under subsection (c)of this section, is greater than the
amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest
on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the
agreement or State statute under which such claim arose.
11 U.S.C.A. § 506(b) (West 2007).
45. Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 237. Section 506(b) states that an oversecured creditor is entitled
to interest. See Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50 FLA. L. REV. 329, 337 (1998);
supra note 44.
46. See Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 241. This is in contrast to fees, costs, and charges, which are
only available on consensual liens as provided for in their agreement. Id.This is hardly a narrow
reading, since the dissent asserted that the language of the section is not clear and unambiguous.
See id. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 245-46 (majority opinion).
48. See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (HowardI), 126 S.Ct. 2105,
2109 (2006). As the dissent points out, however, the equal distribution purpose maybe better stated
in terms of equal treatment of like claims instead of providing priorities to as few creditors as
possible. Id. at 2117 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss3/6

6

Hayes: Bankruptcy Law: An Exercise in Statutory Interpretation--Staying

CASE COMMENT

rendered."49 Also, the instant Court pointed out that the terms
"contributions," "employee benefit plan," and "services rendered" were
not defined in the statute. 50 Without attempting to define those terms in
light of their ordinary meanings, the instant Court declined to borrow the
definition from another statute, concluding that Congress would have
included directions if it had intended to use another statute's definition of
the terms.5
Thus, in the absence of a clear meaning for the priority terms, the
instant Court turned to the legislative history of the priority.52 Congress
enacted the priority in response to the Embassy decision, which held that
contributions to a union welfare plan did not fit into the wages priority.53
The instant Court found that Congress intended the priority to cover forms
of employee compensation that complement or substitute for wages.54
Also, according to the instant Court, the combined monetary cap on both
the priority for wages and the priority for employee benefit plans was
further evidence of the strong link between the two types of
compensation. 5
In determining whether workers' compensation is a substitute for
wages, the instant Court looked more closely at the characteristics of
workers' compensation.56 The instant Court found that such policies
benefit the employer as much as the employee since they give immunity
from tort actions. 57 This quality sets workers' compensation apart from
other plans that remunerate employees for services rendered. 58 The instant
Court also considered the mandatory nature of workers' compensation in
reaching its determination that such insurance is not a bargained-for wage
substitute. 59 Thus, the instant Court determined that workers'
compensation is more appropriately included with other types of liability
insurance than with contributions to employee benefit plans.6 °
The instant Court's focus on the characteristics of workers'
compensation may not help to decide future cases because characteristics
can be variable. 6 ' For example, a few states do not require workers'

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 2116 (majority opinion).
Id. at2112.
Seeid. at2112-13.
Id. at 2111.
Id. at2110-11.
Id. at2111.
Id.
Seeid. at2109.
Id.
Id.
Seeid. at2114.
See id.
See id. at 2119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (pointing out that if states begin mandating other
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compensation6" and several more have considered making other benefits
mandatory.63 Furthermore, the changing nature of tax benefits may make
it more or less appealing for employers to provide certain benefits, such as
pension plans and health insurance.' Congress specifically included
pension plans and health insurance plans when granting the new priority
for employee benefit plans.65 Therefore, relying on the mandatory nature
of plans or the presence of benefits to the employer could arguably exclude
those plans under certain circumstances that Congress clearly meant to
include.66
Also, the instant Court's reliance on the Bankruptcy Code's broad
equal distribution purpose," instead of the plain language or purpose of the
specific provision, may unnecessarily narrow the scope of the priorities.68
Although it is arguable whether the language of the priority is clear,6 9 the
instant Court could have remained more true to Ron Pairby attempting to
construe the words in light of their ordinary meaning.7" While the instant
Court noted that the words in the priority are undefined,7" statutory
interpretation should start with the ordinary and usual meaning of the
words.72 This would have given the Court two choices: (1) determining the

benefits, they might fall outside the priority under the majority's reasoning).
62. Id. at 2120.
63. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-102, 8.5-104 (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring
that employers with 10,000 or more employees pay at least eight percent of their total wages on
health insurance); see also Jennifer Drage Bowser, The People'sChoice: From Stem CellResearch
to ElectoralCollege Reform, Citizens Have Their Say, ST. LEGISLATURES, Dec. 2004, at 16, 17
("California voters had the chance to affirm a new law requiring employers to provide health
insurance for their employees, but it failed.").
64. See Howard IV, 126 S. Ct. at 2119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that by
providing health benefits, employers may receive numerous benefits such as "tax breaks, good will,
a healthy work force, and the leverage to pay lower wages"). See generally Soble, Eggertsen, &
Bernstein, supranote 13 (discussing tax advantages to pension plans that make them attractive to
employers).
65. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 69 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5855.
66. See HowardIV, 126 S. Ct. at 2118-19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 2116 (majority opinion).
68. See id. at 2117 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that "priority provisions should not be
read so narrowly as to conflict with their plain meaning").
69. Compare Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (In re Howard Delivery
Serv., Inc.) (Howard I1), 403 F.3d 228, 237 (4th Cir. 2005) (King, J., concurring) (finding the
language of the priority clearly and unambiguously including workers' compensation), rev'd, 126
S. Ct. 2105 (2006), and id. at 244 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (finding that the plain language of the
priority does not include unpaid workers' compensation premiums), with id. at 239 (Shedd, J.,
concurring) (finding the priority ambiguous).
70. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
71. HowardlV, 126 S. Ct. at 2112.
72. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1917).
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language did not include workers' compensation,73 or (2) determining the
language was ambiguous enough to look to the purpose of the priority.74
In Embassy, where the clear language of the priority did not include the
fringe benefits at issue in the case, the Court looked to the specific purpose
of the priority to see if it was met." Similarly, in Nathanson, the Court
looked to both the plain meaning and the specific purpose of the priority
to determine that it did not include the claim at issue.76 Thus, though the
equal distribution purpose was an overriding theme in those cases, the
actual language and purpose of the priorities controlled.77
In contrast, the instant Court focuses more on the broad equal
distribution aim of the Bankruptcy Code to determine that the claim is not
within the priority.78 Although the instant Court notes that the reason for
adding the priority was to provide for fringe benefits,79 the instant Court
does not examine whether allowing the claim at issue would satisfy the
purpose of the priority. Because it is arguable whether the plain meaning
includes workers' compensation claims,8" determining that the specific
purpose of the priority was not met could have provided the instant Court
with an alternative ground for reaching the same decision while staying
truer to precedent.
The purpose of the priority was to provide additional protection to
employees of a bankrupt business and to keep them from quitting for fear
of losing compensation.8 ' Thus, the instant Court could have determined
that paying a third-party insurance provider would not provide benefits to
employees.82 Alternatively, the instant Court could have determined that
paying the workers' compensation insurer would not have furthered the
purpose because the policy was already cancelled.83 Thus, employees

73. See Howard111, 403 F.3d at 244 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
74. See United States v. Embassy Rest., Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 33 (1959) (reasoning that because
contributions did not fall within the clear language, they must satisfy the purpose for which
Congress enacted the priority).
75. See id
76. See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1952).
77. See Embassy, 359 U.S. at 33; Nathanson, 344 U.S. at 27-28.
78. Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (HowardlP),126 S. Ct. 2105,2109,
2116 (2006).
79. Seeid. at2111.
80. See supra note 69.
81. In re Aer-Aerotron, Inc., 182 B.R. 725, 727 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995); H.R. REP. No. 95595, at 187 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6147-48.
82. See Aero-Aerotron, 182 B.R. at 727 (discussing why the priority should not extend to
third parties beyond employees).
83. See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (In re Howard Delivery Serv.,
Inc.) (HowardIII),403 F.3d 228,230 (4th Cir. 2005) (King, J., concurring), rev 'd, 126 S. Ct. 2105
(2006).
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would not be any less likely to quit. 4 Instead, the instant Court focused
more on the advantages that employers obtain from workers'
compensation-a weaker argument because employees and employers can
be protected simultaneously.85
The instant Court's narrow focus on the equal distribution aim of the
Bankruptcy Code moves away from precedent and toward a new rule of
statutory interpretation for the Bankruptcy Code. Instead of looking to the
plain language of a provision," and then to the purpose of the provision to
determine the meaning,87 the instant Court appeared to construe the
priority to exclude as many creditors as possible.88 Also, by focusing on
the variable characteristics of workers' compensation, the instant Court
left open the possibility that plans included in the priority today could be
excluded in the future.8 9 Thus, future creditors may have trouble obtaining
priority status, even if Congress intended to include them. 9° It took
Congress almost twenty years to overrule the Embassy decision, 91 so it is
empty consolation to suggest that Congress will amend the statute if it
intended to include certain plans. 92 By that time, both the creditor and the
business may be long gone.

84. As noted above, a purpose of the Act was to keep employees from quitting for fear of
nonpayment. See supra note 81.
85. See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (HowardIP),126 S. Ct. 2105,
2109, 2118-19 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
86. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
87. See Unites States v. Embassy, 359 U.S. 29,33; Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25,27-28
(determining if including claims would further the purposes of priorities).
88. See HowardIV, 126 S. Ct. at 2117 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 2119 (expressing disbelief that certain benefits would fall outside the priority
if States mandated them in the future).
90. For example, if States mandated that employers provide health insurance, those benefits
may not have priority status. See id. at 2117-18 (discussing how health benefit plans undeniably
fall within the priority).
91. In response to Embassy, a 1959 case, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1978
to add a new priority for contributions to employee benefit plans. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 69
(1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5855; 4 COLLIER, supranote 35, at P 507.06.
92. See Howard IV, 126 S. Ct. at 2116.
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